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100-character summary: Research reveals five lessons that can help executives manage big, 
complex projects more effectively.  
  
500-character summary: Large-scale, long-term projects are notoriously difficult to manage. 
But recent research on megaprojects — defined as projects costing more than $1 billion — 
reveals five lessons that can help executives manage any big, complex project more 
effectively.  
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The Leading Question: How can executives manage large, complex projects better? 
Findings: 
* Complex projects consist of both predictable, standardized tasks and innovative, 
novel procedures. 
*Manage the two types of work differently, using fixed-price contracts for 
standardized work and more flexible ones for novel procedures. 
*When introducing untested practices or technologies, find a way to rehearse first. 
 
[main text] “Megaprojects” — defined as projects with budgets exceeding $1 billion 
— are important contributors to numerous sectors, including health care, defense, 
mining, telecommunications, transport, energy and water infrastructure, sporting 
events, science, and manufacturing. They represent a significant proportion of many 
nations’ economic activity and profoundly affect productivity, social cohesion, and 
the environment.1 Yet megaprojects have proved notoriously difficult to deliver on 
time and on budget; one estimate suggests 90 percent of them end up over budget.2 
3 
The Sydney Opera House was over 10 years late when it opened in 1973 and a 
staggering 1,400 percent over budget3 and the “Big Dig” Central Artery/Tunnel 
Project in Boston, Massachusetts (original estimate $2.6 billion, actual cost $14.8 
billion) are two prominent examples 
 
Why are megaprojects so difficult to manage? The reasons include technical 
challenges, changes in design and operational requirements, increases in costs, 
disputes over responsibility, and new regulations. Complexity usually increases with 
project scale, and complexity can give rise to uncertainty and an inability to foresee 
the difficulties, changing conditions, and unanticipated opportunities that will be 
encountered once the project is underway. In this article, we argue that one way to 
manage the uncertainties is to innovate throughout the course of the project. What’s 
more, we believe our suggestions are applicable to all large-scale, long-term projects 
— not just projects with billon-dollar budgets. 
 
Specifically, we’ll distill five rules for innovation in large high-risk projects, 
providing managers with guidance on how to modify their plans and processes when 
opportunities arise or conditions change. Our findings are based on more than 10 
years of research into megaprojects. (See “About the Research.”) The projects we 
studied included:  
 
• High-Speed 1 (1998-2007), a high-speed, 109-kilometer railway from London to 
the Channel Tunnel, which cost £5.8 billion (roughly $7.5 billion at today’s 
exchange rates)4.  
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• Heathrow Terminal 5 (T5, 2002-2008), a new airport terminal, hotel, car park, 
subway line, and air traffic control tower, which cost £4.3 billion. 
• Infrastructure for the London 2012 Olympics (2006-2012), which cost £6.8 billion.  
• Crossrail (started in 2007, scheduled to open in 2018), an 18-kilometer railway 
across London that has a budget of £14.8 billion and includes 42 kilometers of new 
railway tunnels and including 10 new and 30 upgraded stations.  
• Heathrow Terminal 2 (2009-2014), an airport terminal now serving 29 airlines that 
replaced an existing terminal and cost £2.5 billion. 
• The Thames Tideway Tunnel project, begun in 2016, a 25-kilometer tunnel and an 
upgrade to London’s sewer system; the project is expected to take up to seven years 
to complete, at a cost of £4.2 billion. 
 
[A-head] Five Rules for Innovation 
 
We follow the view that Donald Sull of the MIT Sloan School of Management and 
Kathleen M. Eisenhardt of Stanford’s School of Engineering express in their book 
Simple Rules: How to Thrive in a Complex World: Management strategy in complex, 
uncertain circumstances is often best articulated as a series of simple rules.5 Based on 
our experiences working on and studying megaprojects, here are our five rules for 
such projects. 
 
[C-head] 1. Assess what’s worked before. When Heathrow’s Terminal 5 was being 
planned, the project team systematically studied every international airport opened in 
the previous 15 years and every U.K. construction project that cost more than £1 
billion built during the previous 10 years.6 One of the chief problems discovered was 
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the use of fixed-price contracts to transfer risks to suppliers, thereby creating 
adversarial relationships with contractors and — worse — freezing designs at an early 
stage of the project, limiting innovation. The planners of Terminal 5 calculated that if 
they used a fixed-price contract approach, the project would end up over budget and 
one year late. Endeavoring to learn from these accumulated lessons, the planners 
created a new delivery model based not on rigid fixed-price contracts but on a 
collaborative, innovative, and flexible process. Unfortunately, the public remembers 
the Terminal 5 project for its disastrous opening days, when more than 20,000 pieces 
of luggage were misplaced and several hundred flights were cancelled. 7 What’s often 
overlooked, however, is that the Terminal 5 project was delivered on time and on 
budget, and a year after the opening was voted the world’s best airport terminal by 
passengers. Furthermore, the problems with the Terminal 5 opening provided 
important lessons guiding key improvements in the megaprojects that would follow 
— improvements we’ll outline in greater detail below.  
 
[C-head] 2. Organize for the unforeseen. While fixed-price contracts may be 
adequate for dealing with predictable and stable conditions, more flexible contracts 
are required to deal with unexpected and rapidly changing circumstances. By using 
cost-plus or cost-reimbursable contracts, for example, the client and contractor enter 
into a relational agreement where there are incentives to build trust, form a 
collaborative culture, and share risks and opportunities.  
 
True, flexible contracts can appear undesirable at first because of their higher up-front 
costs. But such contracts support coordination by mutual adjustment when project 
activities and schedules are modified in real time to address unforeseen 
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circumstances. The client creates incentives encouraging contractors working on the 
project to reveal problems, recover costs, achieve agreed-upon profit margins, exploit 
innovative possibilities, and build solutions. The “T5 Agreement” between the client 
and major contractors in the Terminal 5 megaproject formed the basis of a new 
flexible process for dealing with uncertainty — and was subsequently used as a model 
for the London 2012 Olympics and Crossrail megaprojects.  
 
Another key to managing megaprojects is staffing project teams with innovative 
thinkers — and encouraging teams to remain flexible. After all, a megaproject 
comprises numerous smaller projects, each executed by a project team. When 
organized and incentivized effectively, people with different knowledge and skills can 
adapt and respond flexibly to rapidly changing conditions, unforeseen problems, and 
emergent opportunities. These teams treat existing knowledge and skills as bases from 
which to modify old routines and build new ones. 
 
When it came to planning the London 2012 Olympics, the Olympic Delivery 
Authority exemplified the approach of using flexible project teams. One senior 
Olympic Delivery Authority manager told us that team dynamics depended on 
“having enough excellent people with a real attitude of rapid assessment and decision-
making, to be able to see issues, discuss them, make decisions, and move on.” In 
addition to providing flexibility, well-organized team structures can also forge 
collaboration and overcome tensions that arise when companies with differing 
interests are expected to work together.  
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[C-head] 3. Rehearse first. The risks of cost and time overruns associated with the 
adoption of new technology and practices were minimized on the Terminal 5, 
Olympics, Crossrail, and Terminal 2 projects by reliance on established technologies 
and practices. Where new technologies and practices were introduced, they were first 
tested and proven in off-site trials, dry runs, and other operational environments such 
as smaller airport terminals. 
 
For example, the “roof project” for the main terminal building was considered one of 
the most uncertain parts of the Terminal 5 project. There were concerns about 
erecting roof abutment structures with spans of more than 150 meters. The solution 
was erecting these structures in advance, at an off-site location. Through the off-site 
pilot, project leaders identified 140 lessons, each with a preemptive risk mitigation 
plan, enabling contractors to work more rapidly on-site.8 As a result, the roof project 
was delivered three months earlier than planned.  
 
In contrast, the first few days of operation of Heathrow’s Terminal 5 infamously 
suffered from a lack of rehearsal. Having learned lessons from the problems 
associated with the opening of Terminal 5, the leaders of the Terminal 2 project 
established a new rehearsal-style process for Terminal 2: a “soft” opening. 
Importantly, the soft opening occurred two years prior to the official opening of 
Terminal 2 in June 2014. Terminal 2’s soft opening was led by a dedicated 
“operational readiness” team. That team managed a gradual handover to operations, 
including 180 trials with 14,000 volunteers and 1,700 training sessions. The soft 
opening also included the creation of a mock-up “model terminal” to test check-in 
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software. In addition, there was a test with a live flight and a staged gateway process 
to move each airline into a live terminal building.  
 
Terminal 2 wasn’t the only project that learned lessons from the problem-plagued 
opening of Terminal 5. In its planning for the London 2012 Olympics, the Olympic 
Delivery Authority made a point of completing its construction program by July 2011 
— providing one whole year of testing on live events in the run-up to the Olympic 
Games. 
 
[C-head] 4. Calibrate and apportion risks appropriately. A megaproject contains a 
large proportion of predictable, standardized, and repetitive tasks that have been 
performed many times on previous projects — as well as novel and innovative 
procedures being applied for the first time. This combination requires a balancing act, 
and the concept of “targeted flexibility” provides a solution to it.9 The idea is to break 
down a megaproject into distinct projects, structures, and processes, each of which 
addresses a different piece of the uncertainty.  
 
A targeted flexibility approach creates different contracts and collaborative 
arrangements to address the varying challenges of individual projects within the 
program. A cost-plus contract, as we mentioned earlier, can be used when uncertainty 
is high; a fixed-price contract may be more appropriate when there’s less uncertainty. 
The London 2012 Olympics megaproject used this approach to great success, relying 
on fixed-price contracts to deal with known conditions and risk-sharing, and target-
cost contracts (including contracts based on a suite of what have been called “New 
Engineering Contracts” 10) to deal with less predictable projects, such as the 
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construction of the London Aquatics Centre, the Velodrome, and the Olympic 
Stadium (now London Stadium). 
 
Thanks in part to this approach, ISG plc, the contractor that built the Velodrome, 
came forward with the suggestion to switch from a steel roof to a cable net roof, 
resulting in significant reductions in time and cost.11  
 
[C-head] 5. Harness innovation from start to finish. Formulating a coherent 
statement about innovation can help project leaders plan, coordinate, and 
communicate with research partners and other collaborators from start to finish.12 We 
saw proof of this during the Crossrail megaproject, which introduced the idea of 
establishing an innovation strategy for the construction phase of the project.  
 
Established in 2012, the Crossrail Innovation Strategy created a formal process for 
encouraging members of the project supply chain to submit ideas for innovation. In 
collaboration with Imperial College London, Crossrail’s leaders created a small team 
for the express purpose of identifying, evaluating, and developing new ideas — ideas 
developed internally or originating with members of the project supply chain. 
Crossrail also developed an online digital platform called “Innovate18” to provide 
both insiders and outsiders with a mechanism to submit ideas, including an 
“Innovation Management System” to manage, track, and report on the progress of 
ideas. Innovations likely to benefit Crossrail thus had the chance to gain relevant 
sponsorship and commitment from interested parties well in advance of the actual 
construction. By summer 2015, the program had attracted more than 800 ideas 
ranging from the use of high-definition drone-mounted cameras for site inspections to 
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the repurposing of grout shafts to cool the train tunnels via geothermal heat 
production.  
 
The success of the program made Crossrail’s leaders recognize that there would be 
additional advantages in starting even earlier. So when Andy Mitchell, Crossrail’s 
program director, became CEO of the Thames Tideway Tunnel megaproject in 2014, 
he decided to build upon the Innovate18 digital platform. He also recognized that it 
was important to involve the leaders who would manage the tunnel after construction 
was complete. The cost of operating a rail system, airport, or tunnel over a lifespan of 
several decades is much higher than the cost of designing and building it; those who 
will eventually maintain the asset can often identify and implement innovations 
during the front-end planning and design phase that will improve performance and 
reduce costs later on. Participants in Crossrail and Thames Tideway have developed 
this concept, creating an industry-wide program called i3P, which stands for 
Infrastructure Industry Innovation Platform. i3P has been rolled out to support 
innovation in a number of new megaprojects.13 
 
[A-head] A More Flexible Approach 
 
Despite the diversity of large high-risk projects, there are some simple rules that can 
help improve their performance. The five rules we have described encourage 
innovation to deal with uncertainty. They confer the flexibility to change while 
maintaining the stability required to deliver projects efficiently. And they help 
coordinate innovative action across multiple parties. These simple rules challenge 
traditional project management, which has pushed too far toward control and 
11 
prescription and been characterized by complicated, highly rigid contracts that stifle 
flexibility and innovation. These five rules might seem like common sense, but the 
marked failures of past megaprojects show the value of making such sense much 
more common. 
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Exhibit 1: About the Research 
We undertook our core research on three recent megaprojects in London — Heathrow 
Terminal 5, the London 2012 Olympics, and Crossrail — between 2005 and 2015. 
We also drew upon previous, adjacent, and continuing studies conducted by one or 
more of the authors, including studies of the first phase of High-Speed 1 in 2002 and 
2003, of Heathrow Terminal 2 in 2014 and 2015, and of the Thames Tideway Tunnel 
from 2013 to 2016. Focusing on the strategic management of megaprojects, we 
engaged in long-term research collaborations with sponsors, clients, delivery partners, 
and major contractors.  
 
Our methods included qualitative case studies, semistructured interviews, and 
ethnographic observations. We conducted more than 170 interviews with CEOs, 
project directors, project managers, directors, and project team members, mainly at 
the project head offices but also on-site with project managers engaged in daily 
activities. Although the form of research engagement varied, we produced an in-depth 
case study of each project’s approach to innovation, which was checked and verified 
in meetings with our partners.  
 
Our research activities on Heathrow Terminal 5 from 2005 to 2009 led to invitations 
to study the London 2012 Olympics project in 2010 and 2011 and the Crossrail 
project from 2011 to 2015. Since each project was completed around the time the next 
one began, we had a unique opportunity to observe how people, novel ideas, and 
practices move within and between projects. Distinct patterns of innovation emerged, 
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and we began to recognize how innovative capabilities and processes moved from one 
project to the next.  
 
Our initial work on Heathrow Terminal and then the London 2012 Olympics involved 
observing and analyzing how innovation occurs in megaprojects. When we researched 
Crossrail, we continued with our observational approach, and we were also invited to 
help the client develop and implement an innovation strategy for the project, which 
drew upon lessons learned from previous projects. Our categorization of the five rules 
of innovation emerged during our engagement with the three projects. They were 
tested at numerous academic seminars at University of Pennsylvania, University 
College London, Imperial College London, University of Queensland, HafenCity 
Universität Hamburg, École Polytechnique, BI Norwegian Business School, and 
LUISS Business School. 
 
We thank the following practitioners and scholars for their comments and suggestions 
on an earlier version of this paper: Sir John Armitt, Andrew Wolstenholme, Andy 
Mitchell, John Pelton, Peter Hansford, Brian Collins, Peter Morris, and Timothy 
McManus. We are also deeply grateful for the insightful comments from two 
anonymous referees. 
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Exhibit 2: Five Innovation Rules for Large High-Risk Projects 
The following five simple rules can help improve the performance of large high-risk 
projects. These five rules encourage innovation to deal with uncertainty and confer 
the flexibility to change — while maintaining the stability required to deliver projects 
efficiently. 
Rule Purpose Practices 
1. Assess 
what’s 
worked 
before.  
Learning from other 
projects sectors and 
research organizations 
 
Capturing own prior 
experience 
 
Evaluating risk and 
uncertainty 
Case studies and site visits 
 
Recruitment of expertise 
2. Organize for 
the 
unforeseen. 
Flexibility and 
adaptability 
 
Changing behaviors 
 
Risk-sharing 
Integrated client and contractor 
teams 
 
Flexible contracts 
 
Partnerships and collaboration 
 
 
3. Rehearse 
first. 
Exploring options 
 
Prototyping, proving, and 
improving 
 
Identifying and reducing 
uncertainty. 
Off-site tryouts 
 
On-site tests and trials 
 
Simulations and models 
 
Solution development.  
4. Calibrate and 
apportion 
risks 
appropriately. 
 
Pairing stability and 
change  
 
Managing innovative 
components of the project 
differently from 
standardized and 
predictable aspects  
 
 
Structured process to change the 
project plan 
 
Tailor contracts to address 
uncertainty in the project and 
subprojects 
 
Freeze the design progressively to 
deal with unexpected events 
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5. Harness 
innovation 
from start to 
finish. 
Formalizing structures 
and processes for guiding, 
shaping, creating and 
using innovations 
Explicit innovation strategy 
statement 
 
Establish innovation governance 
and leadership 
 
Develop, capture, and share 
innovations 
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